11/14/1965: Battle of Ia Drang Valley
The Battle of Ia Drang Valley was the conclusion of a series of engagements that had begun with the North Vietnamese Army laying siege to the Special Forces camp at Plei Me four weeks earlier. At this early stage of direct involvement of U.S. ground troops in the war, no major battle had occurred between the North Vietnamese Army and U.S. forces. The NVA were unfamiliar with the U.S. troops’ capabilities, in particular the effective use of helicopters. The original objective of the NVA had been to lure the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) into battle, to learn how they fought. After the NVA was forced to withdraw from Plei Me, U.S. General Westmoreland ordered the 1st Cavalry to “locate the NVA force and bring it to battle.” The NVA was sighted and engaged in early November, and a series of firefights and pursuits ensued. Captured documents indicated that the NVA was following escape routes to Cambodia, and served as a guide in the search efforts.
At the end of the second week of November, the U.S. setup a landing zone (LZ X-Ray) with 430 troops in the valley of the Drang River (Ia Drang Valley). While they expected some NVA forces to be in the vicinity, they were unaware that the LZ was actually surrounded by about 4,000 NVA soldiers, including 2,000 fresh troops, who were preparing for another siege of Plei Me. For the NVA, it appeared to be a stroke of luck to have the Americans positioned with such a small force in the midst of such overwhelming numbers of NVA troops. But although the U.S. was surrounded, their helicopters made them highly mobile and able to bring in more troops. Once they had captured an NVA prisoner and learned of the enemy presence, it appeared that this could become the type of large and decisive conventional battle that U.S. commanders hoped for, rather than the small and inconsequential skirmishes with the VC that had occurred to date.
The battle that ensued lasted three days with the first two days focused around LZ X-Ray, and the third around nearby LZ Albany, where the NVA ambushed 400 U.S. troops who were traveling overland. Overall victory went to the U.S. forces, which had inflicted disproportionately much higher casualties than they had suffered.
What happened at Ia Drang was to become a template for future battles between the U.S. and NVA. The U.S. had employed its superior air power to great effect, both with the superior mobility of helicopter-borne troops enabling it to place soldiers and supplies where they were needed, and with the massive ordnance that could be brought to battle by air strikes. The NVA had demonstrated considerable resilience. Even after suffering devastating losses, they could regroup and renew the attack. In a war of attrition they would prove difficult to beat, even if they lost the battles. The NVA also learned that the U.S. air strike advantage could be countered by getting close to the enemy, where they couldn’t be bombed or shelled.
The Battle of Ia Drang Valley is retold in Harold G. Moore’s book We were Soldiers Once…And Young
The Primer of the Helicopter War
is a good reference for understanding how air mobility was used throughout the war, but can be hard to find.
Seven Firefights in Vietnam (Dover Books on History, Political and Social Science)
Image from http://www.history.army.mil.
(Article for “Vietnam War Timeline” / “Vietnam Timeline” / “Vietnam War History” for November 14 1965)
